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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Medicaid recipients are disadvantaged by the Medicaid 
system.  Even children on Medicaid are extremely deprived of health 
care access compared to their privately insured counterparts.1  For 
example, providers denied seeing sixty-six percent of sick children 
on Medicaid versus eleven percent of children with private 
insurance.2  An eight-year-old seizure victim, a thirteen-year-old with 
severe depression, and a fourteen-year-old with severe asthma were 
among those sixty-six percent of children on Medicaid who were 
denied health care.3  Even those children on Medicaid that the 
provider accepted to see had to wait an extra twenty-two days to see 
a provider versus those children with private insurance.4  The silver 
lining in this sad story is that these sick children were fictitious.5  
Research assistants posed as parents calling in on behalf of their sick 
children.6  Nevertheless, the providers on the other end of the phone 
thought the callers were real parents.7  The Illinois Department of 
Healthcare and Family Services funded this study due to allegations 
that providers were denying young Medicaid recipients equal access 
to care.8  This study ultimately demonstrated the reality of the broken 
Medicaid system and its adverse effects on recipients’ health care 
access.9  
Curious about this unfortunate reality, I began researching the 
general process of the Medicaid system particularly in California.  I 
found that the general sentiment of Californian doctors is that they 
want to help people in need, but they simply cannot afford it.  Many 
                                                          
* Special thanks to Issa Azat and Patrick Nichols for their support and 
feedback. 
 
1 Monifa Thomas, Medicaid Kids Suffer, CHI. SUN-TIMES (June 17, 2011), 
available at 2011 WLNR 12094985. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Thomas, supra note 1. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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doctors who accept Medicaid patients, risk delayed or no payments, 
which often results in providers closing practices.  The Medicaid 
system makes it difficult for doctors to accept Medicaid patients 
because reimbursement rates are about half of what a doctor would 
normally receive from an insurance company.10  Troubled by this 
lose-lose situation, I decided to investigate the underpinnings of the 
Medicaid system in relation to provider reimbursements and 
recipients’ health care access. 
The recession has severely impacted the medical world.11  
Many people who once had health insurance lost their insurance 
during layoffs or can no longer afford private health insurance, which 
in turn has led to more dependents on Medicaid.12  Concurrently, 
states are also experiencing financial difficulties and, as a result, are 
cutting state spending in programs such as Medicaid.13  Medicaid is 
targeted for budget cuts because it is spending for poor, and the poor 
are not as politically powerful to fight the inequalities arising from 
legislative action regarding Medicaid.14  Strategically, budget cuts to 
Medicaid are not immediately apparent; typically cuts occur through 
“restricting eligibility, trimming benefits, raising copayments, and 
reducing provider reimbursement rates.”15  When a state cuts 
                                                          
10 Rosemary B. Guiltinan, Note, Enforcing A Critical Entitlement: 
Preemption Claims As an Alternative Way to Protect Medicaid Recipients’ Access 
to Healthcare, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1583, 1592–93 (2010).  “Physicians frequently cite 
low Medicaid reimbursement rates as their principle reason for refusing to accept 
Medicaid patients.”  Id.; VERNON SMITH ET AL., KAISER COMMISSION ON 
MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE 
CRUNCH CONTINUES: MEDICAID SPENDING, COVERAGE AND POLICY IN THE MIDST 
OF A RECESSION; RESULTS FROM A 50-STATE MEDICAID BUDGET SURVEY FOR 
STATE FISCAL YEARS 2009 AND 2010, 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.kff.org.medicaid/upload/7985.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
11 SMITH ET AL., supra note 10, at 7.  
12Ana Gorman, California Gets OK for Large Cuts to Medi-Cal, L.A. 
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/28/local/la-
me-medicaid-20111028 (last visited Jan. 10, 2013); Pauline Vu, Medicaid 
Programs Feel Weight of Recession, STATELINE (Feb. 6, 2009),  
available at http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=374699 (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
13 SMITH ET AL., supra note 10, at 30. 
14 Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 
1983 and Medicaid Entitlement, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 419 (2008). 
15 Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 1584. 
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providers’ reimbursement rates, the providers cannot afford to help 
additional dependents on Medicaid, which leaves those relying on 
Medicaid without any form of access to medical care,16 and their 
health needs go unaddressed.17  By cutting provider reimbursements, 
the states contradict the goal of Medicaid program to provide health 
care to the poor and disabled.18 
Medicaid is crucial to the United States’ healthcare system.19  
It provides health insurance coverage to “sixty million people and 
accounts for roughly 17% of all healthcare spending and 7% of the 
total federal budget.”20  The spending on Medicaid is only second to 
education.21  In 2008, California reacted to its budgetary crisis by 
cutting providers’ reimbursements by ten percent.22  Providers sued, 
which resulted in a case heard by the Supreme Court on October 3, 
2011, Douglas v. Independent Living Center.23  Despite California 
and other states’ financial inabilities to handle Medicaid, the system 
is ridden with more uncertainties due to the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Douglas and the Affordable Care Act cases.24  In 
Douglas, the court never addressed whether providers or 
beneficiaries can bring suit to challenge provider reimbursements 
under Medicaid, and in the National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius (Affordable Care Act Case), the Court held that 
the Medicaid expansion under the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (PPACA) is constitutional but with an asterisk.25  The Court 
                                                          
16 Sean Jessee, Comment, Fulfilling the Promise of the Medicaid Act: Why 
the Equal Access Clause Creates Privately Enforceable Rights, 58 EMORY L.J. 
791, 797 (2009). 
17 Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 1584. 
18 Id. at 1585. 
19 SMITH ET AL., supra note 10, at 9.  
20 Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 1519; SMITH ET AL., supra note 10, at 9. 
21 Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 1519; SMITH ET AL., supra note 10, at 9. 
22 Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 1519. 
23 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012); see 
also Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, THE OYEZ 
PROJECT AT IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_09_958 (last visited Jan. 10, 
2013) [hereinafter OYEZ PROJECT]. 
24 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
25 Id. at 2607–09. 
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found that the provision which mandated Medicaid-providing states 
to expand Medicaid or lose all Medicaid funding as 
unconstitutional.26  As a result, the Medicaid expansion remains, but 
now, states may choose to adopt the expansion without any penalty.27  
This was not how Congress drafted the PPACA.  A state’s ability to 
choose the Medicaid expansion will make the future of Medicaid and 
goal of universal health insurance coverage more uncertain and 
unrealistic.  
This comment first provides a historical and legal backdrop of 
the Medicaid system, the Equal Access Provision and private 
individuals’ enforcement of the Equal Access Provision through 
litigation in order to analyze the outcome of Douglas in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in the Affordable Care Act Case.  Then 
taking that analysis, this article recommends an approach to handle 
either a cause of action or no cause of action under the Supremacy 
Clause upon the implementation of PPACA. 
 
II.  MEDICAID PROGRAM 
 
In 1965, Congress ratified Medicaid under title XIX of the 
Social Security Act.28  Medicaid “is a cooperative federal-state 
program that provides federal assistance to participating states to 
reimburse providers for covered health services rendered to 
Medicaid-eligible individuals.”29  A state’s participation in Medicaid 
is voluntary.30  Once a state is a part of the program, then that state 
must comply with the Medicaid Act.31  The Center for Medicare and 
                                                          
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 2608. 
28 Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 1590. 
29 Brief for Petitioner at 6, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 
Nos. 09-958, 09-1158, 10-283 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2011), 2011 WL 2062344. 
30 Jon Donenberg, Medicaid and Beneficiary Enforcement: Maintaining 
State Compliance with Federal Availability Requirements, 117 YALE L.J. 1498, 
1500 (2008). 
31 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 29, at 6.  Although Medicaid is a 
voluntary program, all fifty states participate in the program.  Donenberg, supra 
note 30, at 1500.  “Over time, state budgets have become so inextricably linked 
with federal Medicaid funding that withdrawal from the program on the part of any 
state seems politically and financially untenable.”  Id.  See also Bruce J. Casino, 
Federal Grants-In-Aid: Evolution, Crisis, and Future, 20 URB. LAW. 25, 40 (1988) 
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Medicaid Services (CMS), a federal agency within the United States 
Department of Health and Services (HHS), supervises the program of 
participating states.32  
Before a state may participate, a state is required to submit a 
plan for medical assistance to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services.33  Every participating state must codify its Medicaid 
program in its state plan.34  A state plan is a public document that 
remains on file with the CMS and includes a full record of the state’s 
Medicaid programs since its commencement.35  The plan indicates 
which services a state intends to provide as well as any supplemental 
regulation.36  The plan must comply with the Medicaid Act and 
provide the “scope and nature of the state’s Medicaid program.”37  
The Secretary is authorized to revoke federal funding if the state does 
not comply with Medicaid’s requirements.38   
                                                          
(contending that participation in Medicaid is in effect obligatory because of the 
financial strains of states). 
32 Donenberg, supra note 30, at 1500. 
33 See Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 1590. 
34 The State Plan, 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (2012). 
35 Donenberg, supra note 30, at 1506.  
36 42 C.F.R. § 430.10.  Generally, the HHS requires participating states to 
provide certain benefits to everyone on Medicaid.  Donenberg, supra note 30, at 
1505.  These benefits include “physicians’ services, laboratory and x-ray services, 
inpatient hospital services, and comprehensive early and periodic screening, 
diagnostic, and treatment services for children.”  Id.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 1369d(a) 
(2000) (summarizing traditional benefits) as well as “nursing facilities for adults.”  
Donenberg, supra note 30, at 1505.  States can also provide optional services in 
addition to the mandatory services, such as, “prescription drugs and targeted case 
management services.”  Id.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(12)–(19) (2000).  
“Despite their discretionary status, optional service account for a significant portion 
of most states’ Medicaid expenditures.”  Donenberg, supra note 30, at 1505.  Once 
a state accepts an optional benefit, that state must provide that benefit as if it were 
mandatory.  Id. 
37 Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 1590. 
38 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006).  “[T]he Secretary shall notify such State 
agency that further payments will not be made to the State . . . until the Secretary is 
satisfied that there will no longer be any such failure to comply.”  Id.  There are 
three basic federal statutory requirements that apply for all types of services.  
MARK MERLIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32644, MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT 
POLICY 2–3 (2004).  First, “methods and procedures for making payments must be 
such as to assure that payments are ‘consistent with efficiency, economy, and 
quality of care.’”  Id. at 2.  Second, “providers cannot bill a beneficiary when 
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The states and the CMS’s lenient modification process of a 
state’s Medicaid program aids inequalities that arise from provider 
reimbursement rates and the Equal Access Provision.  States may 
subsequently modify its Medicaid program through a State Plan 
Amendments (SPA) or a waiver.39  If a state wishes to modify its 
program beyond “those options specifically authorized under current 
law,” the state must petition to the HHS Secretary for a waiver 
approval.40  If a state makes a “material change to the law, 
organization, policy or operation”41 within the Medicaid program, a 
state must file an SPA with the CMS. 42  An SPA is required to be 
filed with the CMS if there is a change in reimbursement and 
payment methodologies.43  Then, the HHS Secretary must approve 
the SPA.44  Typically, approval of a SPA by the CMS is not 
demanding and the CMS usually grants it.45  In addition, a state can 
seek a waiver for filling a state plan amendment.46  The purpose of a 
waiver of a state plan amendment is “to allow states flexibility [in its] 
Medicaid programs.”47  Essentially, waivers are meant to encourage 
                                                          
Medicaid’s allowed payment is less than the provider’s charge for a service.”  Id. at 
3.  Third, “[t]here [are] an additional set of basic rules for payment of institutional 
services including hospitals, nursing facilities, and intermediate care facilities for 
the mentally retarded.”  Id.  Then, rates are made public so that providers can 
comment.  Id. 
39 Donenberg, supra note 30, at 1506. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
42 Id. 
43 Financing & Reimbursement, CTR. FOR MEDICAID & CHIP SERVS.,  
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Financing-and-Reimbursement/Financing-and-Reimbursement.html (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2013).  “Regulations provide guidance for state on implementing 
Medicaid state plan payment rates consistent with the Act (the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) at 42 C.F.R. 430 and 42 C.F.R. 447).”  Id. 
44 Donenberg, supra note 30, at 1506. 
45 Id.  “In some cases, CMS even provides ‘preprint’ sheets—skeleton 
forms that state administrators can fill in containing boxes that they can check off 
to indicate the options they have chosen to implement—to streamline the process.”  
Id.  
46 Waivers, CTR. FOR MEDICAID & CHIP SERVS., 
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/Waivers.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
47 Financing & Reimbursement, supra note 43. 
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states to try or test theories so that states can deliver the most 
efficient access to medical care.  There are four types of waivers.48  
The pertinent waiver for provider reimbursements is a Section 1115 
waiver.  Section 1115 waivers deal with Medicaid payment 
schemes.49  States use Section 1115 waivers to experiment with 
payment options for program coverage.50  A state will usually 
informally apply for a waiver by submitting a concept paper with a 
proposal.51  If a waiver is approved by the CMS, that waiver is valid 
for five years.52  After the five-year period, states may seek a renewal 
waiver for an additional three years.53 
Often cuts to reimbursement rates are a result of the CMS’s 
administrative enforcement of the Equal Access Provision.  Even 
though every participating state has to comply with the Medicaid Act 
and submit changes to the CMS and Secretary of HHS through SPAs 
and waivers, reimbursements nevertheless vary from state to state54 
because of the modification process,55 and the CMS’s unwillingness 
to enforce non-compliance by suspending funds.56  The CMS is 
unwilling to withhold funds because it is so detrimental to Medicaid 
                                                          
48 Financing & Reimbursement, supra note 43.  Section 1115 waivers are 
for research and demonstration projects.  Id.  Section 1915(b) is for managed care 
waivers.  Section 1915(c) is for home and community-based service waivers.  Id.  
Finally, concurrent section 1915(b) and 1915(c) waivers are for states that want “to 
simultaneously implement two types of waivers to provide a continuum of services 
to the elderly and people with disabilities.”  Section 1115 Research & 
Demonstration Projects, CTR. FOR MEDICAID & CHIP SERVS.,  
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/1115/Section-1115-Demonstrations.html (last visited Dec. 24, 
2012). 
49 Section 1115 Research & Demonstration Projects, supra note 48. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
53 Section 1115 Research & Demonstration Projects, supra note 48. 
54 MERLIS, supra note 38, at 2. 
55 See Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 1590.  The Medicaid Act provides 
flexibility in its wording so that states, to an extent, determine reimbursement rates.  
Donenberg, supra note 30, at 1506. 
56 See Donenberg, supra note 30, at 1506. 
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recipients that it is “rarely, if ever, invoked.”57  If the CMS does 
decide to cut funding, a hearing is required to determine non-
compliance.58  The burdens and amount of time spent toward these 
hearings are an additional deterrent for enforcement.59  Finally, it is 
hard for the CMS to cut funding to states with which they frequently 
interact.60  Administrators deal primarily with states rather than those 
on Medicaid and may value a good working relationship with the 
states over the interest of the Medicaid patients.61  A combination of 
the vague wording of the Medicaid Act, administrative enforcement 
problems, and the recession has resulted in cuts to provider 
reimbursements and those cuts are most likely in violation 
Medicaid’s Equal Access Provision. 
 
III.  THE EQUAL ACCESS PROVISION AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 
 
When Congress first enacted Medicaid, the federal 
government rarely reviewed states’ reimbursements rates.62  Then, in 
1972, Congress had HHS set reimbursement rates.63  But by 1980, 
Congress let states set reimbursement rates again.  Congress wanted 
to provide the states with more flexibility in setting reimbursement 
rates, and as a result it passed the Boren Amendment.64  The Boren 
Amendment provided that states must reimburse providers 
“according to rates the State finds are reasonable and adequate.”65  
Nine years later, Congress enacted the Equal Access Provision 
(EAP).66  The EAP, like the Boren Amendment, regulates state 
                                                          
57 Id. at 1501 (citing Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal Funding 
Conditions Under § 1983: The Supreme Court's Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine 
of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 293 (1996)). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 1501–02. 
61 Id.  See also Key, supra note 57, at 293. 
62 Matthew McKennan, Medicaid Access after Health Reform: The 
Shifting Legal Basis for Equal Access, 7 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 477, 489 (2011). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 512 (1990) (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(A)(12)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. V)). 
66 McKennan, supra note 62, at 489.  
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Medicaid rates.67  However, unlike the Boren Amendment, EAP 
focused on access rather than cost.68  Congress repealed the Boren 
Amendment in 1997, while the EAP still remains.69  The EAP 
mandates that a state Medicaid program must: 
 
[P]rovide such methods and procedures relating to 
the utilization of, and the payment for, care under the 
plan . . . as may be necessary to safeguard against 
unnecessary utilization of such care and services and 
to assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, 
economy and quality of care and are sufficient to 
enlist enough providers so that care and services are 
unavailable under the plan at least to the extent that 
such care and services are available to the general 
population in the geographic area.70 
 
The language in the EAP guards against states cutting reimbursement 
rates to providers during economic difficulties.71  As discussed in the 
previous section, because of the SPA modification process and the 
CMS’s unwillingness to enforce violations of the EAP, provider 
reimbursement rates are not usually in check.72  Provider 
reimbursement rates that are inconsistent with the Medicaid Act are 
even more common during an economic crisis, and during these 
economic downturns, it is usually the providers or recipients that act 
as enforcers and bring suit against states that cut provider rates.73  
But Congress did not explicitly include a private right of action under 
the EAP, thus providers and recipients have historically brought suit 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.74 
                                                          
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2006) (emphasis added) (amended 2010). 
71 Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 1594; see also Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric 
Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization in the Health Care Regulation: The 
Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267 (2011). 
72 Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 446.  
73 Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 1595. 
74See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  Section 1983 provides that 
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A.   Section 1983 
 
Under section 1983, individuals may bring civil suits against 
state officials for a violation of federal rights.75  Federal rights under 
section 1983 also include federal statutory rights, as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court in Maine v. Thiboutot.76  In Thiboutot, the Court 
held that Maine violated section 1983 by depriving Lionel and Joline 
Thiboutot welfare benefits that they were entitled to under the Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. section 602(a)(7).77  In the same year of the 
Thiboutot decision, Congress enacted the Boren Amendment.78  As 
discussed above, the Boren Amendment provided that states must 
reimburse providers “according to rates the State finds reasonable 
and adequate.”79  In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, the 
Court analyzed whether the Boren Amendment created an 
enforceable right under section 1983 when a group of hospitals sued 
Virginia arguing that its reimbursement rates were not “reasonable 
and adequate” as required by the Boren Amendment.80  The Supreme 
Court held that the Boren Amendment was a source of a federal 
                                                          
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress.   
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). 
75 Id. 
76 See 448 U.S. 1, 10 (1980).  Just a year later, the Supreme Court began to 
whittle away at the holding of Thiboutot through Pennhurst Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).  Sayles, infra note 83, at 127.  In Pennhurst, the 
Court determined that in order to bring section 1983 suits, the statute had to have 
language that conferred mandatory not merely precatory rights.  Id.  See also 
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 18. 
77 Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4.  
78 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 n. 2 (1990). 
79 Id. at 502 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1369a(A)(13)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. V) 
(amended 2010)). 
80 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 512. 
 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 32-2 
 
866 
statutory right under section 1983 because it imposed mandatory 
compliance upon the states to the beneficiaries.81  As a result of 
Wilder and the Boren Amendment, individuals brought private 
causes of action to enforce cuts to reimbursement rates through 
section 1983.82 
 
B.   The End of Section 1983: Boren Amendment, Blessing, and 
Gonzaga 
 
In 1997, Congress repealed the Boren Amendment.83  Thus, 
the Boren Amendment and its mandatory language was no longer 
available to help ensure state compliance with reimbursement rates 
through section 1983.  In that same year, the Supreme Court 
answered whether legislation enacted under Congress’ Spending 
Clause84 was enforceable under section 1983.85  In Blessing v. 
Freestone, the Court held a statutory right may be enforced under 
section 1983 if it met three conditions: (1) The plaintiff must be an 
intended beneficiary; (2) the plaintiff must have actual affected 
interest; and (3) the statute must “impose a binding obligation on the 
State.”86  Nevertheless, according to Blessing, a federal statutory 
                                                          
81 Id. at 512. 
82 See, e.g., Visiting Nurse Ass’n of N. Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 
1005 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that providers have a cause of action under section 
30(A) via section 1983); Methodist Hosp., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th 
Cir. 1996). 
83 Bradley J. Sayles, Preemption or Bust: A Review of the Recent Trends 
in Medicaid Preemption Actions, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 120, 129 
(2010) (“Repeal of the Boren Amendment removed the ‘reasonable’ payment rate 
requirements and put the Supreme Court’s holding in Wilder in question.  
Although, Wilder is still considered ‘good law’, its applicability is questionable 
because of the Boren Amendment’s repeal . . . .”). 
84 Medicaid was enacted under the Spending Clause.  42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) 
(2012). 
85 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 332–33 (1997).  However, in the 
specific facts of Blessing, the Court held that the mothers who brought suit under 
title IV-D of Social Security Act did not give the mothers individual right to sue the 
state because it did not fit within the three criteria.  Id. at 342.  Yet, the Court did 
not foreclose the idea that federal statutory rights could be brought under title IV-D 
of the Social Security Act.  Id. at 348. 
86 Id. at 338–41. 
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right is simply a rebuttable presumption.87  A court may dismiss a 
case if Congress intentionally or implicitly prevented a remedy under 
section 1983.88 
Despite the test in Blessing, there was still ambiguity as to 
whether there was or was not an implied private cause of action 
under section 1983.  In 2002, the Court settled this confusion in 
Gonzaga University v. Doe.89  In Gonzaga, the Court held, “[w]e 
now reject the notion that our cases permit anything short of an 
unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought 
under § 1983.”90  The Court reasoned that section 1983 provides a 
remedy for rights—not benefits or interests.91  The Court further held 
that in order to enforce a right under section 1983, a court must first 
determine whether Congress intended to create a private right of 
action.92  If Congress did not intend to do so, then that party may not 
bring a suit under section 1983.93  If there is Congressional intent, the 
courts must then determine whether Congress also created a private 
remedy.94  As a result of Gonzaga, absent specific language, 
                                                          
87 Id. at 341. 
88 Id. 
89 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002). 
90 Id.  The State of Washington required students to obtain an affidavit of 
good moral character from the student’s university in order to become a public 
elementary school teacher.  Id. at 277.  The plaintiff was a student at Gonzaga 
University, a private institution.  Id.  The plaintiff was seeking an affidavit of good 
moral character.  Id.  The person in charge of issuing the affidavits overheard that 
the plaintiff was involved in sexual misconduct and denied the student’s 
application.  Id. at 276.  The student sued under section 1983 alleging a violation of 
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA).  Id.  The FERPA 
“prohibit[s] the federal funding of educational institutions that have a policy or 
practice of releasing education records to unauthorized persons.”  Id.  See also 20 
U.S.C. § 1232g (2006).  The Court held that the FERPA created no personal rights 
to the student in order to bring suit under section 1983.  Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 273. 
91 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 273. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 284.  However, “[p]laintiffs suing under §1983 do not have the 
burden of showing an intent to create a private remedy because §1983 generally 
supplies a remedy for the vindication of rights secured by federal statutes.”  Id.  If a 
plaintiff demonstrates the statute conferred a right of action, then the right is 
presumptively enforceable.  Id.  However, “[t]he State may rebut this presumption 
by showing that Congress ‘specifically foreclosed a remedy under §1983.’”  Id. at 
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individuals cannot bring suit for violations of their rights unless 
Congress explicitly creates a right and provides a remedy.  Since the 
EAP contains no explicit private cause of action, courts have 
interpreted Gonzaga as barring providers and recipients from 
bringing suit under the EAP. 
Despite the repeal of the Boren Amendment and the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Gonzaga, federal circuit courts are still split as to 
whether an individual may bring suit under the EAP via section 
1983.95  Those circuit courts, except the Eighth, that have considered 
whether the EAP creates a private action to providers or recipients 
have rejected it under Gonzaga.96  The Supreme Court has not 
spoken to the issue, and in light of Gonzaga, it appears that section 
1983 is not a viable method to get into court.  This area of law has 
changed greatly over the years and as a result, the Court and 
Congress seemed to have successfully shut the courthouse door to 
section 1983 suits for the EAP, and essentially any spending 
program, absent specific intent.  However, the Ninth Circuit was the 
first circuit court to circumvent the problems posed by the EAP and 
section 1983 by suggesting that there may be an implied cause of 
action in the Supremacy Clause.97  
                                                          
284 n. 4 (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 n. 9 (1984)).  The State 
may show that the statute expressly forecloses a remedy or implicitly.  Gonzaga, 
536 U.S at 284 n. 4.  For an implicitly foreclosed remedy, a State can show that 
Congress created “a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with 
individual enforcement under §1983.”  Id. at 284 n. 4 (quoting Blessing v. 
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997)) (internal citation omitted).  
95 Sayles, supra note 83, at 129. 
96 Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 1600.  See, e.g., Westside Mothers v. 
Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 542–43 (6th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the EAP is too 
broad and non-specific for a judicial remedy); Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 
1059 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that there is no enforceable right for providers 
because the EAP does not focus on recipients or providers as individuals to receive 
a private remedy); Long Term Pharm. Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 57 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (finding that the EAP has “no ‘rights creating language’”); Mandy R. ex 
rel. Mr. R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006) (concurring with the sixth, 
ninth and first district that the language of the EAP is too ambiguous to create a 
right of private action for recipients and providers).  But see Pediatric Specialty 
Care, Inc v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005, 1015–16 (8th Cir. 
2006) (concluding that despite of Gonzaga the EAP created private rights for 
providers and recipients).  
97 See Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, (Independent Living I) 
543 F.3d 1047, 1048–49 (9th Cir.), opinion issued by (Independent Living II), 543 
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C.   Supremacy Clause 
 
The Supremacy Clause, contained in Article VI of the 
Constitution, provides that the Constitution, laws and treaties made 
pursuant to it are the supreme law of the land, and it is from that 
concept that the doctrine of preemption is derived.98  In Gade v. 
National Solid Waste Management Association, the Court held that 
“under the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine 
is derived, ‘any state law, however clearly within a State’s 
acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal 
law, must yield.’”99  Thus, if there is a conflict between state and 
federal law, federal law is controlling. 
Preemption can be either expressed or implied.100  If a statute 
does not contain explicit language of preemption then it may be 
implicit through either 1) field preemption or 2) conflict 
preemption.101  Field preemption is “where the scheme of federal 
regulation is ‘so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.’”102  In 
contrast, conflict preemption is where “‘compliance with both federal 
and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . . or where state law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishments and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”103 
 
                                                          
F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009), and on remand to 
No. CV 08-3315, 2008 WL 3891211 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008), aff’d sub nom. 
Indep. Living Ctr. Of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly (Independent Living III), 572 
F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009), motion to vacate denied, 590 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009), 
petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S. Feb 16, 2010) (No. 09-958).  
98 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICES 
402 (Aspen Student Series 4th ed. 2011). 
99 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) 
(quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1982)); see also CHEMERISNKY, supra 
note 98, at 402. 
100 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98. 
101 Sayles, supra note 83, at 132. 
102 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
103 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. 
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)). 
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1.   Supremacy Clause and Cause of Action 
 
The Supreme Court has never stated that the Supremacy 
Clause is a source of any federal right.104  However, based on the 
Court’s precedent, it may be inferred that the Court permits an 
implied cause of action under the Supremacy Clause when there is an 
express or implied preemption issue before it.105  Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court has never overtly stated that position.106  The Court 
has skirted around the issue by either dismissing the case because 
there was no express right of action, or more commonly deciding the 
case on the merits without considering whether there is an express or 
implied right of action.107 
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. is an example of the Court 
solving a case on the merits without considering whether the 
Supremacy Clause creates a private right of action.108  In Shaw, a 
group of employees claimed that the New York law, which 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in the work 
place, violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA).109  The employees sought an injunction based on the 
notion that federal law preempted New York’s law.110  The Court 
found federal law preempted.111  The Court only briefly addressed the 
plaintiff’s ability to bring the suit in federal court by stating: 
 
It is beyond dispute that federal courts have 
jurisdiction over suits to enjoin state officials from 
interfering with federal rights. A plaintiff who seeks 
injunction relief from state regulation, on the ground 
                                                          
104 See Golden State Transit Corp. v. L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 107 (1989); 
Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613 (1979); see also 
Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 602; Sayles, supra note 83, at 133. 
105 David Sloss, Constitutional Remedies for Statutory Violations, 89 
IOWA L. REV. 355, 377–78 (2004).  See infra notes 104, 198–199 and 
accompanying text.  
106 Sloss, supra note 105, at 378.  
107 Id. at 365; Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 1602–03.  
108 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 86. 
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that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute 
which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal 
question which the federal courts have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.112 
 
Nevertheless, there is a set of cases where plaintiffs sued to 
enjoin state action that conflicted with federal law and the Court did 
not consider the merits of the case because there was no expressed 
private right of action.113  For example, in Alexander v. Sandoval, 
Martha Sandoval brought a class action to enjoin the Alabama 
Department of Public Safety from administrating state driver’s 
license examinations in English.114  Sandoval argued that the driver 
license examination violated section 601 of title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits funding to recipients that 
discriminate.115  The Court refused to decide the case on its merits 
because neither title VI nor its corresponding regulations created a 
private right of action.116  Sandoval and Shaw demonstrated the 
                                                          
112 Id. at 96 n. 14.  See also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160–62 (1908); 
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); Smith v. 
Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199–200 (1921). 
113 Sloss, supra note 105, at 367.  See also Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 
740 (1998) (holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction because plaintiff’s 
declaratory judgment action was not a justiciable cause within the meaning of 
Article III).  David Sloss described the difference between Shaw and Sandoval in 
that Shaw is a case that challenges state or local legislation or administrative 
regulations, whereas Sandoval challenges state or local executive action.  Sloss, 
supra note 105, at 365.  Sloss terms the cases like Shaw as Shaw-preemption cases 
and the second set of cases, like Sandoval, as Shaw-violation cases.  Id.  According 
to Sloss, the Court, absent an explicit cause of action will hear a case on its merits 
if it is a Shaw-preemption case; whereas the Court will refuse to hear the case if it 
is a Shaw-violation.  Id. at 365–70.  According to Sloss, the distinction between 
Shaw-violation and Shaw-preemption cases is merely linguistic.  Id. at 370.  The 
linguistic theory proposes that the Court will reach the merits if the case is phrased 
in the terms preemption whereas the Court will require an explicit cause of action 
for those cases that claim a violation.  Id.  “All twenty Shaw cases that the Supreme 
Court decided between October 1996 and June 2003 are consistent with the 
linguistic theory.”  Id. at 371. 
114 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 278–79 (2001).  
115 Id. at 279. 
116 Id. at 278. 
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Court’s inconsistencies as to whether it will consider a private right 
of action implied in the Supremacy Clause versus requiring an 
explicit right of action.117  
 
2.   Medicaid Cases and the Supremacy Clause 
 
Since Gonzaga, the Court has decided two cases regarding 
preemption and Medicaid.  In Pharmaceutical Research & 
Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, a drug manufacturer challenged 
Maine’s practice of negotiating rebates with drug manufacturers 
arguing that the Medicaid Act preempted it.118  The Court, like in 
Shaw, did not consider the source of the private cause of action and 
decided Walsh on its merits.119  In 2006, in Arkansas Department of 
Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, Heidi Ahlborn was involved 
in a serious car accident, which resulted in permanent injuries.120  In 
order to receive Medicare payments through the Arkansas 
Department of Human Services (ADHS), she had to consent to give 
the ADHS “a claim to reimbursement from ‘any settlement, judgment 
or award.’”121  Ahlborn received a settlement from the accident, and 
ADHS demanded that Ahlborn repay the medical expenses afforded 
to her by ADHS.122  The Court considered whether the Medicare Act 
preempted state action without considering the source of the private 
cause of action,123 and held that the Medicaid Act preempted the 
ADHS’s claim.124  Although the Court has heard preemption cases 
regarding the Medicaid Act and the Supremacy Clause, none of these 
cases have focused on the EAP.  The Ninth Circuit, through Douglas, 
                                                          
117 See supra text accompanying note 113. 
118 Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 649 (2003). 
119 Id. 
120 Arkansas Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 
273 (2006). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 274. 
123 Id. at 272–73. 
124 Id. at 292. 
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was the first court to use the Supremacy Clause to bring a private 
cause of action based on a state’s violation of the EAP.125 
In sum, states are cutting reimbursement rates to providers to 
salvage their suffering budgets.  Medicaid providers and beneficiaries 
are suffering from these reimbursement cuts without a clear venue to 
enforce state compliance with the EAP.  Section 1983 suits seem 
futile after Gonzaga, however the Eight Circuit has ruled that section 
1983 is still applicable to challenge violations of the EAP.  The 
Supreme Court could still speak to this issue, but it seems unlikely 
since it has not since the coming down of Gonzaga in 2002.  Instead, 
the Supreme Court decided to hear whether there is a private cause of 
action for the EAP through the Supremacy Clause.  Unfortunately, on 
February 22, 2012, the Supreme Court remanded the case without 
even addressing the Supremacy Clause issue.126  “Douglas raises 
more questions than it answers, and adds a measure of uncertainty to 
the law applicable in resolving . . . substantive claims.”127  Still with 
no answer as to the enforceability of the EAP and the shaky holding 
as to the Medicaid Expansion, “the courts will continue to be at the 
center of the controversy, namely the enforceability and 
interpretation of Medicaid’s guarantees.”128   
 
IV.  THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
 
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the PPACA into 
law.129  Through the PPACA, Congress aimed to have all Americans 
covered by health insurance, which in return would reduce the cost of 
health care.130  Twenty-six states, several individuals and the 
                                                          
125 After Gonzaga, the circuits that have considered the Equal Access 
Provision held that it is not enforceable under section 1983 with the exception the 
Eighth Circuit.  See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
126 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1210–11 
(2012). 
127 Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic v. Toumpas, 856 F. Supp. 2d 315, 321 
(2012). 
128 McKennan, supra note 62, at 487. 
129 Douglas A. Bass, Validity of the Minimum Essential Medical Insurance 
Coverage, or “Individual Mandate,” Provision of § 1501 of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 60 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (Originally published in 
2011). 
130 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012). 
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National Federation of Independent Business challenged the 
constitutionality of two provisions of the PPACA.131  They 
challenged the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion.132  
The individual mandate requires most Americans to have “minimum 
essential” health insurance coverage.133  Individuals who do not have 
minimum essential health insurance coverage will have to pay a tax 
for non-compliance.134  Under the PPACA, Congress extends the 
current Medicaid program by increasing the number of individuals a 
Medicaid-participating state must cover.135  If a Medicaid-
participating state does not comply with the expansion, that state will 
lose all Medicaid funding.136  The expansion will provide Medicaid 
coverage to adults with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty 
level, adding approximately sixteen million people.137  The Supreme 
Court, in the Affordable Care Act Case, decided on whether these 
two provisions of the PPACA were constitutional.138  
On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court held that the individual 
mandate was a tax and was a valid exercise of Congress’ taxing 
power.139  As for the Medicaid expansion, Chief Justice Roberts with 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito and Kagan 
concluded that the Medicaid expansion was unduly coercive and an 
overstep of Congress’s spending power.140  However, Chief Justice 
Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan 
held that the severability clause in the Medicaid Act saved the 
Medicaid expansion, and essentially severed the unconstitutional 
coercive portion which allowed the Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services to withdraw all Medicaid funding for 
                                                          
131 Id. at 2572. 
132 Id.  
133 Id. at 2580. 
134 Id.  
135 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2581–82.  
136 Id. at 2582. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 2580–82. 
139 Id. at 2600. 
140 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–07. 
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refusing to adopt the Medicaid expansion.141  Thus, all states now 
have the option of adopting the Medicaid expansion.142 
As illustrated throughout this paper, many of the states’ 
Medicaid programs are suffering from budget cuts.  To assist states, 
the PPACA provides that the federal government will help the states 
pay for the Medicaid expansion through the Federal Medicaid 
Assistance Percentage (FMAP).143  FMAP will cover up to 100% of 
the newly eligible individuals on Medicaid from 2014 to 2016.144  In 
2017, FMAP coverage will drop to ninety-five percent, ninety 
percent in 2020 and thereafter.145  Further, the PPACA assures that 
providers be reimbursed at Medicaid rates for the first two years for 
primary care services.146  Through the FMAP coverage and providers 
reimbursements, Congress provided financial incentives to adopting 
the Medicaid Expansion.” 
The Supreme Court’s rulings on Douglas and the Affordable 
Care Act Case will have huge implications on the Medicaid system.  
The uncertainties of not having a means of redress for states’ 
violation of provider reimbursements coupled with the uncertainty of 
whether a state will expand Medicaid leaves those reliant on 
Medicaid in a lose-lose situation.  The PPACA requires all citizens, 
with some exceptions, to have health insurance or that person will be 
“taxed.”  In order to provide insurance to those under the 133% 
federal poverty level, Congress expanded Medicaid.  But the Court 
has left the option to expand Medicaid to the states.  So now, certain 
citizens may be in a situation where they are required to have health 
insurance, but they cannot afford it because the state that they reside 
in does not expand Medicaid coverage to them, subjecting them to a 
                                                          
141 Id. at 2607–08. 
142 Id. at 2566, 2608. 
143 Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization 
in the Health Care Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the ACA, Kan. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 267, 282 (2011). 
144 Id. 
145 Id.  See also Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1201, 124 Stat. 1029, 1051 (2010). 
146 Deborah Bachrach, Medicaid Payment Reform: What Policymakers 
Need to Know About Federal Law, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, INC. 
(Nov. 2010), available at 
http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/CHCS_Payment_Reform_FINAL.pdf. 
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tax for failing to obtain health insurance.  On the other hand, 
Medicaid beneficiaries of states that do adopt the Medicaid 
expansion are essentially forced into a health care system that is 
financially struggling.  Also, there is no reliable legal mechanism for 
these new beneficiaries to ensure that the provider reimbursements 
meet the standards of the Equal Access Provision.  In essence, this 
group of people is either left without a viable health care option, or 
forced into a deficient health care system with little legal redress.  
 
V.  DOUGLAS V. INDEPENDENT LIVING CENTER 
 
A.   Background 
 
This section describes Douglas’s background, and the 
Justices’ reactions to Douglas in oral argument in order to analyze 
the Supreme Court’s decision to remand Douglas.  Douglas is a 
compilation of five different cases that all deal with the California 
legislature enacting laws that cut reimbursements to Medicaid 
providers.147  In 2008 and 2009, the California legislature passed 
three statutes changing its Medicaid plan.148  In February 2008, the 
California Assembly passed Assembly Bill 5 (AB 5), which added 
two new sections to the California Welfare and Institution Code.149  
Under these sections, the Assembly lowered payments to healthcare 
providers by ten percent.150  The justification behind the cuts were as 
follows: “The Legislature finds and declares that the state faces a 
fiscal crisis that requires unprecedented measure to be taken to 
reduce General Fund expenditures to avoid reducing vital 
government services necessary for the protection of health, safety, 
                                                          
147 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1209 
(2012). 
148 Id. at 1208. 
149 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 14105.19, 14166.245 (2009).  Section 
14105.19 cut payments to “physicians, dentists, pharmacies, adult health care 
centers, clinics, health systems, and other providers.”  Indep. Living Ctr of S. Cal, 
Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 2009).  Section 14166.245 cut 
payments regarding hospital care not under contract with the State Department of 
Health Care and services.  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14166.245 (West 2011). 
150 CAL. WELF & INST. CODE §§ 14105.19, 14166.245 (West 2011). 
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and welfare of the citizens of the State of California.”151  A group of 
California Medicaid recipients and providers sued the Director of 
California’s Department of Health Care Services, Sandra Shewry, for 
the cuts in reimbursements, in a case named Independent Living 
Center v. Shewry, the case was later named Douglas when it was 
heard before the Supreme Court.152  In Shewry, the plaintiffs argued 
that the rate cuts were preempted by the EAP, because the cuts would 
lead to less providers becoming involved in the State’s Medicaid 
Program.153  This, in turn, would negatively impact recipients’ access 
to medical care.154 
In Shewry, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ preliminary 
injunction relying on Sanchez v. Johnson holding that the plaintiff 
did not have enforceable rights or, in other words, a private cause of 
action.155  Oddly, Sanchez did not deal with the Supremacy Clause 
but rather section 1983.156  In Sanchez, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
Equal Access Provision did not create an enforceable right under 
section 1983.157  The plaintiffs, in Shewry, appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit.  The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs could bring a suit, 
via the Supremacy Clause, despite not having an express cause of 
action in the EAP.158  The court explained that in order to bring a 
claim under the Supremacy Clause, a plaintiff must only show: 1) 
that federal law allegedly preempts the state law and 2) that standing 
                                                          
151 Id. 
152 See Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1047, 1050, 
1052 (9th Cir. 2008); Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 1606. 
153 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(30)(A) (2006); Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 1606.  
Even prior to AB 5, payments were so low that “45% of primary care physicians, 
50% of specialists, and 90% of dentists in California refused to accept Medi-Cal 
patients or participate in the Medi-Cal program.”  Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 
1606. 
154 Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2005); Indep. Living Ctr. 
of S. Cal. v. Shewry, No. CV 08-3315 CAS (MANx), 2008 WL 4298223, at *5 
(C.D. Cal. June 25, 2008). 
155 Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2005); Shewry, 2008 WL 
4298223, at *5. 
156 Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1055. 
157 Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1057, 1062. 
158 Id.  The Ninth Circuit further explained its decision in a longer opinion 
issued in September of 2008.  Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 
F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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is satisfied.159  The Ninth Circuit Court relied on Shaw to conclude 
that the Supremacy Clause provides standing for a cause of action 
alleging preemption,160 and that the district court wrongly applied the 
section 1983 test to determine whether a cause of action arises under 
the Supremacy Clause.  The court ultimately justified the difference 
between section 1983 and the Supremacy Clause private cause of 
actions.  The Ninth Circuit, relying on Supreme Court precedent, 
reasoned that the Supreme Court expressly made the test for bringing 
suits under section 1983 more difficult than that of the Supremacy 
Clause.161  Therefore, the Supremacy Clause not section 1983 is the 
proper doctrine under which plaintiffs should seek redress for injury 
under the EAP, which resulted in the Ninth Circuit as the first circuit 
to hold that the Supremacy Clause creates a private cause of action 
for providers and recipients under the EAP.162  The Ninth Circuit 
vacated the district court’s ruling and remanded the case to be heard 
on its merits.163  On remand, the district court held, in conjunction 
with the Ninth Circuit, that there was a private cause of action under 
the Supremacy Clause.164 
The district court came down with its decision on August 8, 
2008.165  Shortly thereafter, the California legislature enacted a 
second statute in September of 2008 repealing the February 2008 
                                                          
159 Shrewry, 543 F.3d at 1058.  
160 Id. at 1056.  
161 Id. at 1065–66.  On remand the district court granted the injunction 
under Orthopedic v. Belshe.  Guiltinan, supra note 10, at 1611.  In Belshe, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the EAP requires providers’ reimbursements to be 
“consistent with efficiency, economy, and [the] quality of care” and “sufficient to 
enlist enough providers to provide access to Medicaid recipients,” while also 
requiring the state Medicaid program to use “responsible cost studies” containing 
reliable data when setting those rates.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit upheld the injunction 
when the Director appealed.  The Ninth Circuit found that Belshe was controlling 
and further stated that the Director violated the EAP because when he implemented 
the reimbursement rates he failed to rely on any data to justify cuts.  Id.  See 
generally Orthopedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th Cir. 1997). 
162 McKennan, supra note 62, at 502. 
163 Shewry, 543 F.3d at 1049. 
164 Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Shewry, No. CV 08-3315 CAS 
(MANx), 2008 WL 3891211, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008). 
165 Id. at *1.  
    
Fall 2012 A Broke(n) System  879 
statute by reducing the amount of cuts.166  Finally, the California 
legislature enacted its last statute in February 2009, which placed a 
limit on the State’s “maximum contribution to wages and benefits 
paid by counties to providers of in-home supportive services.”167  
The first statute that the California legislature enacted in February of 
2008, the same statute that was argued in Shewry did not have a 
corresponding SPA, as required by the CMS.168  This failure to file 
an SPA may have been the sole reason for the start of these lawsuits, 
as will be discussed later in this paper.  After the district court ruled 
against the State in August of 2008, the State then submitted to the 
CMS a series of SPAs.169  Once the State submitted its SPAs, the 
CMS reviewed them.170  Yet, litigation had already begun before the 
agency had time to finish reviewing these statutes.171  In November 
2010, the CMS held that these statues were not consistent with the 
EAP.172  Thus, California appealed within the administrative 
agency.173 
Meanwhile, on January 18, 2011, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari of Douglas v. Independent Living Center, consolidating 
five cases into one.174  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
specifically as to whether “Medicaid recipients and providers may 
maintain a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce 
§1396(a)(30)(A) by asserting that the provision preempts a state law 
                                                          
166 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1208 
(2012). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 1209. 
171 Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1209.  
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ACTIONS, Certiorari Granted: 
Private Parties’ Right to Seek Injunctive Relief Against Implementation of State’s 
Allegedly Preempted Laws Reducing Medicaid Reimbursement Rates, 01-21-2011 
U.S. SUP. CT. ACTIONS 7 (2011); OYEZ PROJECT, supra note 23. 
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reducing reimbursement rates.”175  The Supreme Court heard oral 
argument on October 3, 2011, which is summarized below.176  
 
B.   Oral Argument 
 
This section analyzes the Justices’ sentiment during oral 
argument to help predict the unclear holding of Douglas and to help 
determine, if the Court will one day decide the Supremacy Clause 
issue.  The Supreme Court heard oral argument on October 3, 
2011.177  Chief Justice Roberts seemed concerned with the breadth of 
finding a private cause of action out of the Supremacy Clause, and 
thought it served merely as an “end run around” section 1983 suits.178  
He stated: “The answer is yes, [Congress] intended to deprive 
[plaintiffs] of the right to sue under the statute.”179  Justice Breyer 
voiced similar concerns about the widespread implications of finding 
a cause of action.180  He stated: “There must be a limit because if 
there is not a limit . . . I can go in my office and I look at the statute 
books . . . [and then] run right into court [with a state law that is 
contrary to federal law].”181  He also expressed concern about the 
effect of a private cause of action on the judiciary, in that, 
inconsistencies that would arise by having judges across all 
jurisdictions interpreting the enforcement of the EAP.182  Justice 
Scalia and Justice Thomas also seemed in favor of finding that there 
is no private cause of action, but on different grounds than Justice 
Breyer and Chief Justice Roberts.  Justice Scalia, with little input in 
the oral argument, and Justice Thomas, with none, will arguably base 
                                                          
175 09-958, Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, 
Inc., Questions Presented, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (2012), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/09-00958qp.pdf. 
176 OYEZ PROJECT, supra note 23. 
177 Id. 
178 Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. 
Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (Nos. 09-958, 09-1158, 10-283), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ argument_transcripts/09-958.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2013).  
179 Id. at 58. 
180 Id. at 47. 
181 Id. at 47–48. 
182 Id. at 36–37. 
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their opinion on their concurrences in Blessing and Walsh.183  In 
those opinions, both Justices argued that there is no private cause of 
action under the spending context, without explicitly stated rights, 
because spending programs are like contracts between the State and 
the Federal Government.184  Thus, like contract law, unintended 
third-party beneficiaries should not be able to enforce violations of a 
contract.  Here, the Medicaid Act is essentially a contract between 
the State and the Government and third parties cannot enforce their 
rights unless explicitly stated otherwise.  
The other Justices seemed to lean toward finding a cause of 
action.  Justice Kennedy, relying on the brief of the former officials 
of HHS, noted the impracticality of the CMS to exclusively enforce 
the EAP and that a private cause of action may actually make the 
process more manageable and not terribly burdensome to the judicial 
system.185  Justice Alito, Justice Kagan, and Justice Sotomayor kept 
on insisting for justifications as to why they should treat this case 
differently than any of the cases in the past.186  These Justices seemed 
content on not addressing the Supremacy Clause issue and just 
hearing the case on its merits as they have done in the past.187  Yet, 
later in the argument, Justices Kagan and Sotomayor seemed to be 
willing to limit a Supremacy Clause cause of action by requiring the 
parties to first exhaust administrative measures before a court may 
hear the case.188  Justice Ginsburg appeared most sympathetic to 
supply a cause of action to the beneficiaries of the EAP.189  She 
raised the points that the CMS does not have viable options to 
prevent injuries to those reliant on Medicaid and that the CMS can 
                                                          
183 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349 (1997) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 683 (2003) 
(Thomas J., concurring). 
184 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring); Walsh, 538 U.S. at 
683 (Thomas J., concurring). 
185 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 178, at 8.  Justice Kennedy 
refuted the State’s “the sky is falling” argument if there was a private cause of 
action by stating that there would not be thousands of judges hearing these cases, 
but only district court judges; and, in the case of California, there are only four 
districts.  Id. 
186 Id. at 13–14. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 28–29, 50, 59. 
189 Id. at 5. 
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only withhold funds, which has an even more detrimental effect on 
Medicaid participants.190  During drafts of this paper, the Supreme 
Court decided Douglas.  Prior to its decision, this section predicted 
that the case would come down to a 5 to 4 decision.  On February 22, 
2012 it did.191  However, Justice Alito joined the dissent, and Justice 
Breyer joined the majority.  Based off oral argument, Justice Breyer 
raised some of the best points as to why there should not be a cause 
of action; nevertheless he joined the majority.  
 
C.   Holding 
 
A month after the Supreme Court heard oral argument, the 
CMS reversed its prior holding and held that California’s statutes 
were consistent with the EAP and approved California’s SPAs.192  
The Justices in the majority opinion believed that the CMS’s 
approval changed the posture of Douglas as discussed in the Court’s 
February 22, 2012 decision.193  Douglas came down to a 5 to 4 
decision, with the majority ignoring the Supremacy Clause issue.194  
The majority felt that the CMS’s approval of California’s statutes did 
not change the substantive question of whether there is a cause of 
action under the Supremacy Clause.  However, now that the CMS 
approved the rates, the providers and beneficiaries are required to 
take a different legal course through sections 701–706 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).195  Thus, the majority 
remanded the case so that the Ninth Circuit could decide if there is 
still a private cause of action available under the Supremacy Clause 
once the administrative agency has spoken.196 
Justice Breyer delivered the majority opinion, despite his 
appearance in oral argument that he was against addressing the 
Supremacy Clause issue.  In the opinion, he explained that because 
the CMS approved California’s reimbursement cuts, the CMS’s 
                                                          
190 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 178, at 5–6.  
191 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1209 
(2012). 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 1210. 
194 Id. at 1207. 
195 Id. at 1210. 
196 Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1209. 
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approval does not make these cases moot, but it does put them “in a 
different posture,” since “[t]he federal agency charged with 
administering the Medicaid program” has now found that the “rate 
reductions comply with federal law.”197  Thus, now that the 
administrative process was exhausted, the providers and beneficiaries 
could bring suit under sections 701–706 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act versus the Supremacy Clause.198  The majority further 
elaborated on the importance of the use of the administrative 
agencies’ procedures and stressed that utilizing the Supremacy 
Clause post-administrative decision could usurp the power of the 
CMS.199  Nevertheless, the Court still remanded the case, so that the 
parties could argue the Supremacy issue post-administrative 
decisions, versus mid-administrative proceedings, as it was originally 
granted.200  The majority position is unclear.  The Court seems to be 
trying to convey that once administrative procedures are exhausted, 
the way to get into court is through the APA, not the Supremacy 
Clause, but the Court still wants the Ninth Circuit to address the 
Supremacy Clause issue on remand. 
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the dissent.201  
The Chief Justice clearly stated, “I believe, there is no private right of 
action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce [the EAP], that is the 
end of the matter.”202  Justice Roberts argued that since Congress did 
not explicitly state a cause of action under the EAP, then it makes no 
sense to claim that the Supremacy Clause itself must provide one.203  
By holding that if there was a private cause of action under the 
Supremacy Clause, the Court would contravene Congress’s intent to 
not provide a private cause of action.204  Further, Chief Justice 
Roberts argued that if the Court held there was a private cause of 
action under the Supremacy Clause it would impinge on the 
separation of powers because the Court cannot create a remedy under 
                                                          
197 Id. at 1210. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 1210–11. 
200 Id. at 1211. 
201 Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1211. 
202 Id. at 1214. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 1212–13. 
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the law where Congress did not expressly create one.205  Justice 
Roberts seemed confused as to why the majority provided ample 
support that the Supremacy Clause is no longer applicable because 
there is the possibility to bring suit under the APA but nevertheless 
remanded the Supremacy Clause issue to the Ninth Circuit.206  Using 
the majority’s and his own arguments, Justice Roberts pondered why 
Douglas should have been in front of the Court in the first place 
when the agency did participate in the administrative process.207 
 
D.   Administrative Process for the Equal Access Provision and 
the Administrative Procedure Act 
 
Congress can provide for administrative hearings and 
remedies that must be exhausted before plaintiffs can bring legal 
action.208  The purpose of exhausting the administrative process is to 
prevent “premature inference with agency processes, so that the 
agency may . . . have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to 
afford the parties . . . the benefits of its experience and expertise, and 
to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.”209  Once 
an agency action is final—where there is no other adequate remedy—
that decision may be subject to judicial review.210  The APA allows a 
person suffering from an adverse final agency decision to seek 
judicial review of the agency’s action.211  The reviewing court must 
resolve, “all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of 
                                                          
205 Id. at 1213. 
206 Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1214–15. 
207 Id. 
208 Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 482 (1986).  
209 Bowen, 476 U.S at 484 (citation omitted).  The administrative 
exhaustion doctrine applies only to remedies mandated by statute or agency rule.  
Id.  It does not require parties to exhaust remedies that are merely an option.  Darby 
v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 143 (1993).  However, where Congress has not 
explicitly required administrative exhaustion, courts must decide whether it was 
Congress’s intent to exhaust administrative remedies.  Id.; DSE, Inc. v. United 
States, 169 F.3d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Moncrief v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 276, 
284 (1999).  Congress seems to have intended to enforce the EAP disputes through 
the administrative proceeding.  See infra text Part C.i. 
210 The Amendment Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).  
211 Id. § 702.  
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the terms of an agency action.”212  In addition, the reviewing court 
must set aside agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”213  While 
an agency action is under review, the reviewing court may postpone 
the agency’s action.214  Further, the court may be required to 
postpone the agency’s decision “to prevent irreparable injury.”215  
It is evident from the Medicaid Act that Congress intended for 
the CMS administrative process to be utilized before parties tried to 
enforce the EAP in court.  Under 42 C.F.R. § 430.3, Congress 
provides three types of disputes that might arise under Medicaid, and 
provides appeals for those disputes.216  The appeal pertinent to this 
article is under 42 C.F.R. § 430.3(a), this statute permits appeals 
regarding compliance with federal requirements.217  Congress 
                                                          
212 Id. § 706.  
213 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (emphasis added).  The statute in full:  
 
The reviewing court shall—  
      (1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed; and  
      (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to   be—  
       (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance   with law;  
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, 
privilege, or immunity;  
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;  
(D) without observance or procedure required 
by law;  
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a 
case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or 
otherwise  reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute; or  
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that 
the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing 
court. 
 
Id. § 706(1)–(2)(F). 
214 Id. § 705.  
215 Id. 
216 Appeals under Medicaid, 42 C.F.R. § 430.3 (2012). 
217 42 C.F.R. § 430.3(a). 
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provides that if there is a dispute “to whether a State’s plan or 
proposed plan amendments, or its practice under the plan meet or 
continue to meet Federal requirements are subject to [a] hearing 
provisio[n] . . . .”218  Sections 430.6 –.104 lay out the requirements 
for this type of hearing.219  Congress requires that the CMS and the 
State be parties to the hearing.220  Other individuals may join as 
parties if the issues at the hearing have caused them injury and the 
issues are within their interest as to be protected by the federal 
statute.221  Once the hearing is decided upon, that decision “is the 
final decision of the Secretary, and constitutes ‘final agency action’ 
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 704 . . . .”222  Through these statutes, 
it is clear that if there is a conflict between federal and state law as to 
a state plan amendment or state’s compliance with federal law, 
Congress intended for the administrative agency to handle the 
inconsistency first, and once the agency has decided, then an 
aggrieved party could seek judicial review under the APA. 
However, the CMS also has the ability to waive state plan 
amendments as discussed in supra Part II.  If the CMS permits a 
waiver, it is unlikely that 42 C.F.R. § 430(a) will become an issue 
because the state will not bring a hearing to contest a granted-waiver 
in its favor.  Since only a state or the CMS can bring a hearing as to 
inconsistent state action, providers and beneficiaries are left without a 
hearing.  But, if the Secretary approves of a waiver, providers and 
beneficiaries can still seek judicial review under the APA.223  
                                                          
218 Id. 
219 Hearings on Conformity of State Medicaid Plan and Practice to Federal 
Requirements, 42 C.F.R. § 430.6 (2012). 
220 Parties to the Hearing, 42 C.F.R. § 430.76(a) (2012).  
221 42 C.F.R. § 430.76(b)(1).  If a party wishes to join the hearing, then 
that party must file a petition within fifteen days after notice of hearing is 
published.  42 C.F.R. § 430.76(b)(2).  The petition must state the petitioner’s 
interest, the issues to which the petitioner wishes to participate, which will be 
appearing for the petition, and whether the petitioner wishes to present witness.  42 
C.F.R. § 430.76(b)(2)(i)–(iv). 
222 Decisions Following Hearing, 42 C.F.R. § 430.102(c) (2012) 
(describing the effect of the administrator’s decision) (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis added).  
223 Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[t]he district 
court also correctly found that § 1315(a) waivers are subject to APA review.”).  See 
also Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 380 (9th Cir. 2011).  
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However, as of March 23, 2010, Congress required that the Secretary 
shall provide for waivers “a process for public notice and comment at 
the State level, including public hearings, sufficient to ensure a 
meaningful level of public input . . . .” 224  Through the PPACA, 
Congress is trying to have the public become more involved in the 
Medicaid decision-making process.  However, Congress has not 
provided a specific remedy or appeals process for providers or 
beneficiaries under the EAP. 
 
VI.  THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND DOUGLAS’S POTENTIAL 
IMPACT ON THE EQUAL ACCESS PROVISION 
 
This section discusses the holding in Douglas and how it is 
exemplified in the light of the PPACA.  This section then 
recommends an approach to help manage the comingled problems of 
the Equal Access Provision and the PPACA. 
 
A.   Interpreting Douglas 
 
“Douglas raises more questions than it answers . . . .”225  As 
the dissent adequately pointed out, “it is difficult to see what would 
be left of the original Supremacy Clause suit.  Or, again, why one 
should have been permitted in the first place, when agency review 
was provided by statute . . . .”226  This section analyzes the Supreme 
Court’s decision to remand the case. 
First, the Supreme Court could want the providers and 
beneficiaries to exhaust administrative venues first before bringing a 
cause of action.  If the providers and beneficiaries do that, then there 
                                                          
224 42 U.S.C. § 1315(d)(2)(A) (2006).  42 U.S.C. § 1315(d)(2)(C) (2006) 
further requires “a process for providing public notice and comment after the 
application is received by the Secretary, that is sufficient to ensure a meaningful 
level of public input.”  Id.  Congress also requires periodic evaluation by the 
Secretary to ensure compliance with the demonstration projects, and the Secretary 
must report to Congress any actions taken by the Secretary in respect to 
demonstration projects.  42 U.S.C. § 1315(d)(2)(C); 42 U.S.C. § 1315(E); 42 
U.S.C. § 1315(d)(3). 
225 Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic v. Toumpas, No. 11-CV-358-SM, 2012 
WL 683502, at *6 (D.N.H. Mar. 2, 2012). 
226 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1215 
(2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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will be no Supremacy Clause issue because there will be means of 
redress via the APA.  This seems to be the holding that the Supreme 
Court advances and is most consistent with Congress’s intent.  
Congress provided administrative procedures for the state, the CMS, 
and those reliant on Medicaid to use first before running into court.  
If there is a reimbursement cut, a state should file an SPA with the 
CMS, and the CMS should review or waive it.  Once the CMS makes 
a decision as to waive or review, there are opportunities for providers 
and beneficiaries to seek judicial review under the APA.  Thus, if the 
CMS and the State adhere to the administrative procedures of the 
SPAs, then cases like Douglas should be irrelevant because there will 
be a cause of action under the APA.  The problem, as was in 
Douglas, is when the State does not file an SPA and the CMS does 
nothing to enforce state compliance.  At that point, the providers and 
beneficiaries are left without a way to enforce the state’s non-
compliance, because the CMS has made no administrative decision 
that the providers and beneficiaries could challenge under the APA.  
If there is no administrative enforcement, then an implicit cause of 
action under the Supremacy Clause might be necessary. 
The second possible interpretation of the Supreme Court’s 
holding is that the Supremacy Clause is a viable cause of action 
regardless of the parties’ ability to get into court via the APA.  Under 
this view, the Supreme Court could mandate the providers and 
beneficiaries to exhaust administrative venues first before bringing a 
cause of action, while there still remains court access via the 
Supremacy Clause.  Thus, the Supremacy Clause remains as an 
option regardless of the administrative process.  Under this view, by 
leaving the Supremacy Clause open resolves the problem when there 
are no administrative remedies available because the state did not file 
an SPA and the CMS did nothing to enforce state action.  However, 
leaving the Supremacy Clause action open could lead to 
inconsistencies between the APA and the Supremacy Clause as 
recognized by both the majority and the dissent.  To permit a 
different result under the APA and the Supremacy Clause “would 
subject the States to conflicting interpretations of federal law by 
several different courts (and the agency), thereby threatening to 
defeat the uniformity that Congress intended by centralizing 
administration of the federal program in the agency and to make 
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superfluous or to undermine traditional APA review.”227  Essentially, 
leaving both avenues open could lead to inconsistencies and might 
result in the judiciary overstepping its powers by usurping the 
administrative process intended by Congress. 
Third, the Supreme Court’s action to remand and re-argue the 
Supremacy Clause issue, despite their recognition that APA would be 
the proper course of action for providers and beneficiaries, might 
imply that the Supreme Court recognizes that there is a cause of 
action under the Supremacy Clause.  The Supremacy Clause issue is 
difficult to resolve because it is politically charged in light of 
PPACA, and it could disrupt precedent.  That being said, the Court 
may have intended to leave this Supremacy Clause issue open so that 
there is some avenue for the providers and beneficiaries to get into 
court, if the state does not file a SPA and the CMS does not monitor 
the state’s actions.  This implicit cause of action serves as an 
additional check to ensure that the administrative process is working 
and the state legislature is conforming to federal law.   
On balance, the Court seems ready to solve this Supremacy 
Clause issue because the Court specifically granted certiorari as to 
“whether Medicaid providers and recipients can maintain a cause of 
action under the Supremacy Clause . . . by asserting that the 
provision preempts state laws,”228 but it seems that the Court may 
want to wait until the PPACA goes into full effect and see how the 
PPACA functions before extending any private cause of action under 
the Supremacy Clause, specifically in regards to the EAP.  In 
addition, by temporarily evading the Supremacy Clause issue, the 
Court seems to be trying to speak to Congress as to whether the EAP 
has enforceable rights for providers and beneficiaries.  But Congress 
actually seems to be moving in the opposite direction by repealing 
the Boren Amendment and not including right-creating language in 
the EAP once the Court ruled on Gonzaga.  In Gonzaga, the Supreme 
Court could have resolved the circuit split as to whether the EAP has 
enforceable rights under section 1983.  But it has chosen to address 
the Supremacy Clause issue, which is perplexing because there are 
many other methods that the Court could use to find or deny 
                                                          
227 Id. at 1211. 
228 UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ACTIONS, supra note 174. 
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enforceable rights under the EAP, without disrupting every case 
heard on federal preemption. 
But in the end, by evading the Supremacy Clause issue, the 
Court does not have to address or disrupt its precedent.  The Supreme 
Court has heard many suits that have sought injunctive relief based 
on federal preemption without requiring section 1983’s conditions to 
be met.229  The Supreme Court’s precedent demonstrates the Court’s 
preference for solving these cases on its merits without considering 
its source of cause of action.230  Nevertheless, the Court’s precedent 
is not consistent.231  The Court has refused to hear “preemption” 
cases on its merits without an express right to bring suit.232  However 
some academics describe this inconsistency as merely linguistic.233  
In those cases where there was not an explicit cause of action but the 
Court resolved the case on the merits, the plaintiffs sought an 
injunction because state law was inconsistent with federal law and 
thus preempted.  Whereas, in those suits that were declined on the 
merits for not having a private cause of action, the plaintiffs sought 
injunctions because state law violated federal law.234  Thus, the 
contradicting precedent is not extremely detrimental to the Court if it 
decides to rule on the Supremacy Clause issue.  It can simply be 
distinguished that the Supremacy Clause arises under preemption, not 
violations.  Despite political and precedent issues, the Court may 
decide in the near future whether there is a cause of action under the 
Supremacy Clause.  The following section discusses the implications 
of finding a private cause of action under the Supremacy Clause. 
 
                                                          
229 See generally Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 
644, 649 (2003); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Ray v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); City of Burbank v. Lockhead Air Terminal 
Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973). 
230 See supra text accompanying note 113. 
231 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 278–79 (2001); Calderon v. 
Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998) (holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction 
because plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action was not a justiciable cause within 
the meaning of Article III). 
232 See supra text accompanying note 113. 
233Sloss, supra note 105, at 370–71. 
234 Id.  “All twenty Shaw cases that the Supreme Court decided between 
October 1996 and June 2003 are consistent with the linguistic theory.”  Id. at 371. 
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B.   Will there be an implicit private cause of action? 
 
This section analyzes the disadvantages to both sides of (1) 
finding a cause of action or (2) not finding a cause of action, while 
demonstrating how the drawbacks of each position are further 
exemplified in light of the constitutionality of the PPACA.  If the 
Supreme Court, at some time in the future, decides that the 
Supremacy Clause creates an implicit cause of action for individuals 
it (1) may lead to excessive litigation, (2) impact other spending 
programs, and (3) discourage the CMS restructure. 
If there is a cause of action, there would be more lawsuits due 
to the economic state of the country because states are making more 
cuts to Medicaid reimbursements.  States are cutting Medicaid 
reimbursement rates, while more people are turning to Medicaid for 
healthcare assistance as their own financial affairs suffer.  Thus, the 
increase in the amount of beneficiaries and the decrease in the 
amount of money to fund Medicaid will lead to the states trimming 
funds.  Further, the more beneficiaries, the more likely that one will 
bring a lawsuit.  Ultimately, a cause of action for these beneficiaries 
would eliminate the legal hurdle of section 1983, making it easier to 
get into court. 
Assuming all states accept the Medicaid expansion under the 
PPACA, litigation would most likely increase because the Medicaid 
expansion would add sixteen million people to Medicaid.  Also, as 
the CMS’s responsibilities increase, it will have even less time to 
regulate compliance with the EAP, which may lead to more 
noticeable inconsistencies, and thus, to more suits by the increased 
number of beneficiaries.  In sum, pumping more people into the 
Medicaid program that is already struggling with financial and 
administrative enforcement, while arming providers and beneficiaries 
with a cause of action, will result in more lawsuits. 
If the Court finds a private cause of action under the EAP, it 
could lead to a broad application of enforcement of the other 
spending provisions that do not provide an explicit cause of action.  
Those beneficiaries would now be able to bring suit under the 
Supremacy Clause any time state law is inconsistent with federal law.  
This too would contribute to an overall increase in litigation, because 
any beneficiaries of a spending program who were denied the right to 
bring a suit for non-compliance in the past now could bring suit.  No 
one is really sure as to how many federal programs there are, 
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according to Hill, a researcher in Washington D.C.235   Hill spent a 
week searching through various sources in Washington to see if 
anyone knew.236  No one knew.  No one even guessed.237  His guess 
of 10,000 “was met with varying degrees of ‘Sounds about right!’ or 
‘Who knows?  It could be 10,000 times 10,000!’”238  This is 
concerning because the Court could rule on a case without realizing 
its full potential to reach across all federally-funded programs. 
The breadth of this holding impacts the PPACA as well.  The 
PPACA’s purpose is to remedy the nation’s healthcare system by 
mandating that all citizens have healthcare.  If individuals have the 
opportunity to bring lawsuits, it would contradict the uniformity and 
social benefits that PPACA is trying to promote.  If there is a private 
cause of action, different lawsuits could create inconsistencies among 
jurisdictions and states.  Without uniformity in this regard it will be 
difficult to implement this massive Act.  Also, the Supreme Court’s 
decision as to the Medicaid expansion creates even more uniformity 
because some states may or may not adopt Medicaid expansion.  
Based on the uncertainty as to which states will adopt the Medicaid 
expansion and whether there is a cause of action, it may make the 
next few years extremely litigious and potentially cripple Medicaid 
because now groups of people may be left in a situation where: 1) 
they must be insured but cannot afford insurance because their state 
of residence did not adopt the Medicaid expansion, or 2) they are 
insured under the Medicaid expansion, but cannot access healthcare 
because there is no legal redress for inconsistent provider rates.  
The CMS is underfunded and short-staffed.239  It does not 
have the resources, power or desire to enforce the EAP.240  
                                                          
235 Frank Hill, Just How Many Federal Programs Are There Anyway? 
TELEMACHUS (Sep. 27, 2009), http://www.telemachusleaps.com/2009/09/just-how-
many-federal-programs-are.html.  Frank Hill was the Chief of Staff to former 
Congressman Alex McMillan (R-NC-9), 1985–1995; budget associate on the 
House Budget Committee, 1991–1995; member of the Commission on Entitlement 
and Tax Reform, 1994; and Chief of Staff to former Senator Elizabeth Dole.  Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Brief of Former HHS Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) 
(Nos. 09-958, 09-1158, 10-283), 2011 WL 3706105, at *19–20.  
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Regardless if the Court finds that there is or is not a cause of action, 
the CMS needs to restructure its administrative enforcement—
especially in light of the holding in Douglas that might require 
exhausting the administrative process.  If there is a cause of action, 
the CMS will continue to rely on individuals to enforce EAP while it 
concentrates on other matters, such as fraud detection.241  Here, 
adoption of Medicaid expansion might actually help to encourage 
restructure of the administration enforcement of the CMS, because 
upon its implementation, the CMS’s responsibilities will greatly 
increase, and it will need to implement a system of effective 
administrative enforcement.242  However, since states have the option 
to adopt the Medicaid expansion, there may arise problems where 
some states adopt the expansion and others do not.  This 
inconsistency among states will most likely increase the burden on 
states that have adopted Medicaid expansion, because those 
individuals who cannot afford health insurance without this Medicaid 
expansion may have to relocate to states that provide for Medicaid 
under the PPACA.  Thus, states that adopt Medicaid expansion may 
see an increased burden by accepting those individuals to whom 
Medicaid expansion was supposed to cover but did not.   
On the contrary, if the Supreme Court finds that the 
Supremacy Clause does not create an implicit cause of action, (1) the 
CMS would not have the resources to enforce exclusive compliance 
with the EAP; and (2) it would eradicate beneficiaries’ opportunity to 
prevent injury through the legal system when states do not comply 
with federal law.  If there is no cause of action, then the CMS will 
have sole enforcement of the EAP.  The CMS has typically relied on 
beneficiaries to bring suit when states are not complying with the 
EAP.  However, if there is no cause of action, the CMS will have to 
                                                          
241 Id. at *19. 
242 Id.  The CMS already seems to be predicting potential administrative 
difficulties in light of Douglas and Florida—in May 2011, the CMS drafted a set 
of proposed rules focusing on the administrative enforcement of the EAP.  See 42 
C.F.R. § 477 (2012); 76 Fed. Reg. 26342-01 (May 6, 2011).  The rule encourages 
transparency, better utilization of information, and communication between states, 
providers, and recipients to achieve more realistic results.  Id.  The rule proposes a 
state-level implementation system where the state would have to continually report 
to ensure that it is remaining in compliance.  Id.  Nevertheless, the rule still does 
leave a lot of leeway and interpretation to the states on how to help ensure the EAP 
is followed.  Id. 
 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 32-2 
 
894 
replace the role of the private litigant.  The CMS does not have the 
manpower, finances, or effective deterrents to ensure states are 
complying with the EAP.243  The CMS’s enforcement staff for the 
entire Medicaid program consists of 500 people for all the states, and 
the staff oversees other provisions aside from the EAP.244  In 
addition, the CMS lacks the effective enforcement remedies to 
prevent states from acting inconsistent with the EAP.  The CMS has 
only two enforcement options.  It can disprove an SPA or cut funding 
for non-compliance.  The CMS does not want to cut funding 
altogether because it is much more detrimental to providers than a 
state not complying with the EAP.  Further, the CMS does not have 
any remedies for injured beneficiaries; all the CMS can do is prevent 
the state from acting inconsistently.  Thus, beneficiaries could be 
injured by state action, but if the CMS does not see it as an injury, 
those beneficiaries cannot seek retribution or prevent injury.  Also, 
the administrative procedure to cut funds is time-consuming, which 
serves as another deterrent to enforcing the EAP.  If there is no cause 
of action when the PPACA is implemented, the Medicaid expansion 
by those states who accept the expansion will only add increased 
burdens in the form of responsibilities and recipients that will weigh 
down an administrative agency that is already stretched at its seams. 
There are two concerning issues that arise if there is no cause 
of action upon the PPACA’s full implementation.  First, individuals 
at the 133% poverty level would essentially be forced into Medicaid 
but left without a cause of action to alert states of reimbursement cuts 
which impact the overall access to healthcare.  Thus, those 
individuals’ healthcare would essentially be left exclusively in the 
hands of the CMS and the state with little or no opportunity to 
oppose either state or CMS action.  This seems contrary to the 
underlying theme of the PPACA—the idea of healthcare for all.  
Without private litigation as a check on the states, it seems that states 
could undermine the PPACA—because without a cause of action it 
would be easier for the states to successfully cut reimbursement rates.  
Second, states can also undermine the PPACA by not adopting 
Medicaid expansion.  States can choose not to adopt the expansion 
and shift the burdens of those who need Medicaid expansion onto 
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other states.  Also, by not adopting the expansion, there will be less 
Medicaid beneficiaries for a state’s administrative agencies to handle.  
However, the drafters of the PPACA must have analyzed the 
states’ present inability to comply with the Medicaid Act.  Thus, the 
PPACA provides for financial breaks for Medicaid expansion.  The 
federal government will cover up to 100% of newly eligible 
individuals on Medicaid from 2014 to 2016.245  In 2017, coverage 
will drop to ninety-five percent, then ninety percent in 2020 and 
thereafter.246  This provision seems to be helpful to providers, 
recipients and the Medicaid program overall.  However, this 
provision applies only to newly eligible individuals not those who are 
already on Medicaid.247  Those who are currently on Medicaid, once 
the PPACA goes through, will not receive the federal payment, but 
rather still be under the states’ reimbursement rates.  Therefore, a 
situation could arise where providers choose to only see newly 
eligible individuals because they know that the federal government 
will pay for those individuals.  Thus, if the Court decides to bar all 
individual causes of action under the Supremacy Clause, existing 
Medicaid recipients could be in a situation where they cannot 
command state compliance of a spending program, and may be 
treated differently from newly eligible individuals because their 
reimbursement rates are guaranteed by the federal government.  
Under this scenario, the access to healthcare does not sound so equal.  
In light of these potential issues, regardless of whether a state 
chooses to adopt Medicaid expansion or whether a future case holds 
that there is an implicit cause of action under the EAP, the Medicaid 
program has inefficiencies that need to be addressed.  
 
C.   Recommendations: Breathing Life into the Equal Access 
Provision through Cooperative Enforcement 
 
In light of Douglas, the Supreme Court has expressed reliance 
on the administrative agency.  Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Douglas, there is still the possibility that the Court will hear whether 
or not there is an implicit cause of action under the Supremacy 
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Clause.  Regardless if there is or is not a cause of action, either 
scenario has flaws, and those flaws become more apparent in light of 
the PPACA.  Douglas demonstrated the flaws within the Medicaid 
system, specifically the enforcement capacity of the CMS.  The most 
apparent notion that could be drawn from Douglas is that there is 
going to be greater reliance on the CMS.  The CMS will inevitably 
still have to oversee enforcement of the EAP, and this section 
suggests structural changes to help. 
CMS enforcement is here to stay.  The biggest issue is 
funding, and the following proposed recommendations would require 
more funding.  It would be wise to invest in the money up front in 
order to strengthen the administrative workings versus spend money 
later on in unpredictable costly litigation.  Nevertheless, these 
recommendations are made on the notion that the federal government 
will be willing to shell out more than .04% of its total expenditures 
on Medicaid to help the CMS enforce Medicaid and the potential 
Medicaid expansion.248 
This recommendation focuses on what a state can do when it 
decides to cut reimbursement rates.  The state could not reduce 
reimbursement rates until it (1) receives approval from the CMS—if 
the CMS does not recognize state non-compliance, then there should 
be a way that providers and beneficiaries can get into court or use the 
administrative process to alert the CMS of a violation of the EAP; (2) 
provides data specifically demonstrating the states’ need to cut 
reimbursement rates; (3) encourages discussion with providers and 
recipients as to the reimbursement rates; and (4) upon approval, the 
state must provide an annual report justifying reimbursement rates. 
The reason why Douglas came about was because the state 
cut reimbursements prior to the CMS’s approval.  Under Douglas, 
had a plan been submitted or waived, or there was some prior action 
by the CMS, there most likely would not have been a lawsuit because 
there would have been access to the courts through the APA.  By 
requiring the state to wait until the CMS decides will prevent suits 
like Douglas and will prevent injury to beneficiaries while the CMS 
is considering the SPA.  However, issues arise when neither the state 
nor the CMS acts in accordance with the Medicaid Act.  To solve this 
problem, Congress should provide a way for providers and 
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beneficiaries to alert the CMS of states’ nonconforming actions either 
through the administrative process or in court.  This would hopefully 
mitigate the high expenses of litigation.  Under this “cause of action”, 
the CMS should provide remedies for injured individuals.  The 
administrative agency could provide remedies for those that are 
injured when a state fails to comply with the EAP.  Remedies would 
serve as an effective deterrent to the state since the CMS’s current 
enforcement tools are limited to cutting Medicaid funds all together 
or denying the SPA.  Through remedies, the CMS can penalize the 
state, but not to the extent of taking away all of its funding.  Further, 
under a Supremacy Clause cause of action, there are no remedies for 
a plaintiff, just injunctive relief.  Thus, by providing a proceeding 
with available remedies, more beneficiaries and providers will be 
encouraged to enforce state compliance than under the Supremacy 
Clause. 
Next, if a state wants to cut reimbursement rates, it should 
have to show sufficient data to justify cutting those rates.  This will 
prevent states from arbitrarily or hastily cutting rates.  The data 
should be collected over an extended period of time to preserve 
against a state trying to quickly cut rates based on a recent change in 
the economic market.  It also will encourage more experts to look at 
the finances of the state and analyze where the states can adequately 
place its money. 
Before a state cuts reimbursements rates, it should be required 
to speak to recipients and providers to gather information on how a 
cut in reimbursement rates would impact them, because essentially 
the whole Medicaid program is for the benefit of the recipient’s 
health.  By gathering input and encouraging discussion early, this 
will hopefully mitigate against lawsuits and result in effective 
solutions that do not need to be decided by a court. 
Finally, to ensure that a state files an SPA that is consistent 
with the Medicaid Act, the CMS should require that a state provide 
an annual update of its compliance and finances to see if the rate is 
adequate.  This will safeguard the states from arbitrarily cutting 
reimbursement rates.  Although this may seem tedious, it will provide 
a state with insight of its rates and economic health in regard to 
Medicaid, which will in turn hopefully benefit the program.  This 
type of oversight will be particularly beneficial especially if a state 
chooses to expand Medicaid.  These recommendations are not 
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inclusive, but may be essential to help advance both the Medicaid 
system as is and under the PPACA. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
The medical world in the United States has dramatically 
changed.  What Douglas and the Affordable Care Act Cases have 
demonstrated is that there needs to be a change in the United States’ 
healthcare system.  Currently, the system seems broken.  The 
Medicaid program struggles between funding and making sure that 
recipient have adequate health care.  In light of these bleak economic 
times, it has been a difficult balance for states and the CMS to 
handle.  In addition, the means of enforcement to ensure this balance 
between funding and healthcare is in jeopardy and Douglas does not 
help to clarify whether beneficiaries or providers may be able to 
bring a private cause of action to help the CMS enforce state 
compliance with the Equal Access Provision. 
This paper concludes that leaving exclusive enforcement to 
the CMS would not necessarily be catastrophic, nor would finding a 
private cause of action in the EAP via the Supremacy Clause.  
Whether the Supreme Court finds that there is a cause of action under 
the Supremacy Clause for the EAP is manageable if the CMS’s 
administrative enforcement of the EAP is more transparent, and it 
supplements a private cause of action.  Although the suggested 
recommendations require more CMS involvement; in theory, these 
recommendations are workable.  The problem is putting these 
recommendations into practice.  And, at the end of the day, it comes 
down to this: What do you do with a broke state, broke citizens and a 
broken system? 
